Diagram of the FIU pedestrian bridge with the critical member highlighted in red

Engineering Oops: Florida
International University Pedestrian
Bridge Collapse
by Austin Crawford, Mechanical Engineering Junior

“Building bridges” is a common metaphor used to describe
the action of connecting people, things, places and ideas
that are separated by some barrier. The bridges that we build
in the literal sense often invoke ambition and aspirations
for our communities, states or nations to become more
than just an isolated entity, but rather an integral part of the
economies and cultures of the surrounding world. As such,
bridges are often designed not only with functionality in mind
but also with a sense of grandeur and style that reflect these
aspirations. This became the case with Florida International
University (FIU) located in Miami, Florida, and their desire to
build a pedestrian bridge over Southwest 8th Street into the
adjacent community of Sweetwater.
The bridge would allow students to cross the road onto
campus more safely, especially considering the tragic
death of a student hit by a passing vehicle the prior year. It
would also promote more travel between campus and the
community, offering students a convenient area to socialize
outside of classes while increasing FIU’s influence in the
community. Being the physical manifestation of FIU’s culture,
the bridge required an innovative and aesthetically pleasing
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design. FIGG Bridge Engineers offered a design that fit
those criteria, so they won the $14.2 million bridge contract.
Unfortunately, due to key design errors, the bridge collapsed
while under construction on March 15, 2018. The incident
killed six people, including construction personnel and
motorists caught driving underneath the bridge at the time. It
is a sobering tragedy for anyone in the engineering field, and
it shows that even in modern times with advanced techniques
and designs, the fundamentals must always be accounted for
when working on important projects.
Overview of Project
The bridge in question consisted of two spans: one over the
highway and one over a parallel canal. Both spans met in the
middle above a main support column. FIGG employed the
accelerated bridge construction (ABC) method to build and
place the 175-foot main span traversing the highway. The
ABC method involved the onsite prefabrication of segments
to be installed onto existing support columns. The ABC
method proved desirable for this project due to its costeffectiveness and the dramatic decrease in time required to
construct the bridge. The latter reason became necessary
given the desire to avoid the blockage of the busy eight-lane
highway for too long. Although ABC provided reliability in other
instances, the design of the bridge had to take portability into
account which may have caused engineers to overlook key
structural features.

The university originally called for an iconic-looking cablestay design where the main deck is supported by tension
cables connected to a main support tower, not unlike the
Golden Gate Bridge. However, cable-stay bridges must be
constructed on-site and would have resulted in long-term
road closures. Attempting to reconcile the convenience of
the ABC method with the aesthetic of a cable-stay bridge, the
engineering firm proposed an unorthodox truss-style bridge
in which there would be a single row of concrete members
in the center of the bridge connecting the walking-platform
and a canopy on top. To incorporate the cable-stay aesthetic,
metal pipes would connect the top of the canopy to the main
support column, but they would do little in terms of load
bearing.
Design Flaws
Trusses are common structural elements in bridges. They
are very effective at distributing loads evenly throughout
the structure and preventing any one member from bearing
too much stress. However, multiple factors rendered the
proposed truss design as unorthodox. First, the truss
consisted primarily of concrete, instead of the more
commonly used steel for trusses. Concrete is relatively weak
in tension, meaning the members had to be made very thick
to compensate for the weakness. This approach in turn
dramatically increased the weight of the bridge. Second, the
truss employed a single row of members down the center as
opposed to two rows of members on either side of the bridge.
This decision effectively doubled the load on each member
of the truss, further increasing the need for thicker, heavier
members. Finally, while at first seeming like a minute detail,
the angles of the truss members had to be adjusted to line
up with “cables” to make the bridge seem more appealing
visually, due to the asymmetry of the bridge and the faux
cable-stay design. Adjusting the angles of members within a
truss changes the load distribution throughout the structure.
Because of that, the bridge’s load distribution efficiency
diminished. These combined factors likely compromised the
structural integrity of the bridge.
Several independent structural engineers performed their
own analyses of the bridge design and reached the same
conclusion on the design. They determined the bridge’s
design to be unsound, particularly at the member connecting
the support column on the main span opposite from the
main support column in between the two spans to the upper
canopy. They deemed this member to be critical since failure
in that member would cause the support column to fail, and,
subsequently, cause the entire bridge to collapse. Based
off the engineers’ calculations, it appears the bridge design
firm made the member too thin to support the required load.
The likely reason for this error fell to a miscalculation in
the original design plans, since the truss contained thicker
members elsewhere, but they bore less of a load than the
critical member in question.

Catastrophe
Even before the collapse, reports came in that cracks formed
within the truss structure near the critical member, but the
head engineer of FIGG brushed these reports off, claiming
that they held no major concern. Repairs would be made to
the cracks later. The day of the collapse, workers for MCM
Construction, the company contracted with constructing
the pedestrian bridge, began tightening internal support
rods within the bridge, possibly as a method to prevent the
cracking from spreading further. It is highly speculated that
this tensioning increased the load within the critical member
of the truss past its breaking point, causing the joint at the
member and the vertical support column to fail “explosively,”
in turn collapsing the entire main span of the bridge onto the
highway below.
Aftermath
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) commenced
a thorough investigation into the cause of the collapse.
The only details about the cause of the collapse at the
current moment came from speculation from outside
engineers not associated with NTSB or FIU. However, the
consensus from these structural experts points to a design
issue that led to the fatal catastrophe. While ingenuity,
convenience and aesthetics are important aspects of any
engineering project, functionality and safety should never
be compromised as a result. While there may have been
unpredictable circumstances that led to the bridge collapse,
a simple increase of the critical member’s width from
two feet to three feet may have prevented the failure and
increased the reliability of the structure. One of the important
responsibilities of engineers is to account for unforeseen
scenarios and to create designs that are functional while also
displaying ingenuity and creativity. In doing so, they ensure
the safety of their workers, and more importantly, the public.
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